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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
In Ingraham v. Wright,' the United States Supreme Court sanc-
tioned the use of corporal punishment as a means of discipline in the
public schools. Relying on the distinction between criminal and civil
penalties, the majority2 ruled that paddlings administered in school are
not "punishment" within the intent of the eighth amendment.3 The
Court, in this first decision that has considered the applicability of
procedural due process to corporal punishment in schools, 4 also rejected a
requirement of even minimal safeguards prior to the imposition of corpor-
al punishment.5 Consequently, common law remedies and state legisla-
tion are the only safeguards that protect the school child from excessive
corporal punishment.
The case arose because severe paddlings that resulted in injury and
extended school absence6 had been administered to plaintiffs, who were
students in a Florida junior high school. Basing their suit for damages and
1. 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
2. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justice Stevens also filed a separate
dissenting opinion. Id.
3. Id. at 1412. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text infra.
4. The Supreme Court has never before considered the procedural due process issue.
It granted certiorari on the eighth amendment issue because of a split among the lower
courts. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976); Sims v. Wan, 388 F. Supp. 543
(S.D. Ohio 1974); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973)(holding the eighth
amendment not applicable in the context of the public school). Contra, Bramlet v. Wilson,
495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974)(holding the eighth amendment applicable to corporal punish-
ment administered in the public schools). Additionally, a number of cases assumed that the
eighth amendment might be applicable but decided the case on other grounds. See Coffman
v. Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Roberts v. Way, 398 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt.
1975); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp.,294 (M.D. N.C. 1975);Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp.
555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Sims v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v.
Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
5. 97 S. Ct. at 1418. See notes 42-48 and accompanying text infra.
6. Ingraham was given twenty licks with a paddle because he responded too slowly to
his teacher's instructions. This resulted in a severe hematoma that kept him out of school for
eleven days. On two occasions plaintiff Andrews was struck on his arms; one such occasion
deprived him of the full use of his arm for one week. Id. at 1405. For a further recitation of
facts, see Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
for declaratory and injunctive relief on the Civil Rights Act, 7 the plaintiffs
argued that the administrator's conduct violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. 8 After a series of reversals by the lower courts, 9 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 10
Traditionally, the common law doctrine of in loco parentis" was
used to justify the use of corporal punishment in the public schools. 12 The
teacher stood in the place of the parent and had the authority to use
reasonable' 3 force to discipline a student. Today the authority to disci-
pline is based upon the power of the State to impose punishment reason-
ably necessary to maintain order and the proper educational
atmosphere. 
14
A majority of the states condone the use of moderate corporal
punishment either through statutes15 that specifically authorize its use or
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1964). Section 1983 of this Act provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Because a claim under § 1983 requires "state action," this discussion is limited to public
schools. Teachers and administrators in the public schools are considered agents of the
state, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958), and thus their ability to discipline students
constitutes state action. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976); Bramlet v.
Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
8. Plaintiffs contended that due process required notice and a formal hearing with
counsel and the opportunity for cross-examination prior to the imposition of corporal
punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
9. In Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), a three-judge panel reversed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit. This panel ruled that punishments devised
by school officials are subject to eighth amendment scrutiny and found violations of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. The panel remanded the case to the district court for a
full hearing. On appeal after trial, the circuit court stated that the eighth amendment was not
applicable to corporal punishment administered in the public schools and rejected the due
process argument. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
The writ of certiorari was limited to the eighth amendment and the procedural due process
issues. Plaintiffs had unsuccessfully argued below that corporal punishment constituted a
violation of substantive due process. The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on this
issue.
II. The phrase is defined as "[i]n the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged,
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
896 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
12. Baechle, Corporal Punishment in Schools: An Infringement on Constitutional
Freedoms, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 560 (1971).
13. A variety of elements must be considered to determine what is "reasonable"
punishment. Among these are "the seriousness of the offense, the attitude and past behav-
ior of the child, the nature and severity of the punishment, the age and strength of the child,
and the availability of less severe but equally effective means of discipline." Ingraham v.
Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1408 (1977). See 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 583, 584 (1971).
14. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407-08 (1977). See Note, Balancing In Loco
Parentis and the Constitution: Defining the Limits of Authority Over Florida's Public High
School Students, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1974). The Court believes this view of the
derivation of the authority to punish is "more consonant with compulsory education laws."
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407 (1977).
15. Much criticism has been directed toward these statutes because they infringe on
the right of the parent to raise the child as he sees fit and on the right of the child to be free
codify the common law ,16 or through court decisions that reiterate the
common law rule. 7 Only two states specifically prohibit the use of any
corporal punishment,' 8 whether reasonable or unreasonable.'
9
Administration of corporal punishment in the public schools has
been the object of great controversy. Critics argue it serves no valid
educational purpose, but only fosters resentment in the student and
degrades human dignity. 20 Proponents advocate the use of corporal pun-
ishment as a disciplinary measure because it is immediate, generally
inflicts only transitory pain, and causes no lasting injuries.
2 1
The key question in an eighth amendment22 analysis, however, is not
the usefulness of corporal punishment as an educational tool, but whether
such classroom discipline constitutes "punishment" within the meaning
of the amendment .23 While "[t]he Constitution itself is silent as to the
meaning of the word 'punishment'," 24 a study of the case law construing
the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment "confirms that it
was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. '21 Courts have consis-
tently held that the prohibition does not apply to civil penalties because
from invasions on the dignity and integrity of his person. See Baechle, supra note 12, at 561;
12 DUQ. L. REV. 645 (1974); 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 583, 585 n.24 (1971).
16. See Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1408 n.23 (1977), for citations to these
statutes.
17. See id. at 1408 n.28, for examples of such decisions.
18. These two states are Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G (West
Supp. 1977), and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 1968). The National
Education Association has developed a model statute that also prohibits the use of corporal
punishment except in extreme circumstances. Note, A Chance to Whip Corporal Punish-
ment: Eighth Amendment Applied to Corporal Punishment in the Schools, Bramlet v.
Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974), 7 CONN. L. REV. 116, 120 n.26 (1974)[hereinafter cited
as Note, A Chance to Whip Corporal Punishment].
19. An Ohio statute that authorizes the use of reasonable corporal punishment, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.41 (Baldwin 1975), was unsuccessfully attacked on eighth and
fourteenth amendment grounds. Sims v. Wain, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 536
F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1693 (1977). The provisions of this statute are
similar to provisions in the Pennsylvania Code, 22 PA. CODE § 12.5, that have recently been
struck down by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on grounds that the State Board
of Education lacked authority to promulgate such regulations. Girard School Dist. v.
Pittinger, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 370 A.2d 420 (1977).
20. See 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 583 (1971).
21. See Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 259 n.20 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
24. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, - n.6, 355 A.2d 647, 662 n.6 (1976).
25. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1409 (1977). A sentence imposed for a criminal
act has always been considered "punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
See, e.g., Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1965). In recent years, the
definition has been expanded to include conduct by officials during the time the complainant
is incarcerated. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (incarceration without
medical care); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974)(punishment imposed on
juveniles at medium security institution); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968)(corporal punishment imposed on prisoners in Arkansas penal institutions). The pro-
hibition has even been expanded far enough to include the form of treatment known as
aversion therapy. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); see Leinwand, Aversion
Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and Treatment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 880 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Leinwand].
such measures are imposed not to punish, but to accomplish some other
valid governmental purpose. 26 The distinction between civil penalties and
criminal punishments, however, is not always clear.
27
Although corporal punishment in the public schools is primarily civil
in nature,28 a quasi-criminal element is present-the conduct of the child
that results in the infliction of corporal punishment is the violation of a
school rule or regulation. 29 The dissent in Ingraham emphasized this
aspect, arguing that it brought the punishment imposed within the
scrutiny of the eighth amendment. 30 "The relevant inquiry is not whether
the offense for which a punishment is inflicted has been labeled as
criminal, but whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those
ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation,
or deterrence." 31 Justice White considers it anomalous that prisoners are
protected against beatings for breaches of discipline by the eighth amend-
ment, but that school children are not .32
Distinguishing between school and penal institutions, the majority
reasoned that "[tihe openness of the public school and its supervision by
the community affords significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses
from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner." 33 Unlike the
inmate, a child-is free to leave the school and can readily communicate
abuses to parents. If such abuses occur, state civil or criminal actions are
available against the teacher who has exceeded his authority.' 4 While
26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). In Trop, the Court declared expatriation
cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of military desertion.
27. A brief discussion of the problems the civil-criminal distinction raises can be
found in Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 854-57 (1961).
28. Its use is authorized for the purpose of maintaining order in the schools. See note
14 and accompanying text supra.
29. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976)(disruption of class, tardi-
ness); Coffman v. Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1976)(absence from school without
parents' consent); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975)(violation of rule
against throwing kickballs except during designated play periods).
30. The spanking of school children, like any other form of punishment, "involves an
institutionalized response to the violation of some official rule or regulation proscribing
certain conduct" and is imposed for the purposes of rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribu-
tion. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1420 (1977)(dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 1420 (1977). See also Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1972);
Leinwand, supra note 25; Steinberg, Corporal Punishment in Schools: Baker v. Owen-The
Need for Reexamination, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 325, 343 (1976).
32. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1419 (1977). See 7 CUMB. L. REV. 169, 175
(1976). Nevertheless, Justice White believes that "spanking in the public schools is [not] in
every instance prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401,
1423 (1977). See also id. at 1419 n.1 (White, J. dissenting).
33. Id. at 1412.
Judges and commentators have used the rationale that confinement is only a circum-
stance incidental to school while it is the primary reason for imprisonment. See, e.g., Sims
v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Note, A Chance to Whip Corporal
Punishment, supra note 18, at 130; 45 U. CINN. L. REV. 500, 505 (1976).
34. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1412 (1977). The dissent, however, correctly
notes that "the availability of state remedies has never been determinative of the coverage
or of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 1422.
For a discussion concerning the personal liability of teachers and administrators for
depriving students of their constitutional rights, see 78 W. VA. L. REV. 259 (1976).
these considerations -the openness of the school and the availability of
state court remedies-supported the majority argument, the basis of the
decision is the prior case law interpreting the eighth amendment.35 In the
light of this judicial precedent, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court
could have decided differently.36 Thus, the remaining question of
whether corporal punishment is "consonant with the requirements of due
process" 37 determines what, if any, constitutional protection from poten-
tial abuse school children will receive.
Ingraham was the first Supreme Court case that considered the issue
of requiring due process prior to the use of corporal punishment in the
public schools. 38 The procedural due process analysis entails two separate
elements: whether the interest asserted comes within the fourteenth
amendment's protection; 39 and if so, the nature of the process that is
due."" Although all the justices agree that "corporal punishment in public
school implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest'' 41 within
the fourteenth amendment, they are divided on the second question.
Even though there is some risk of an unlawful intrusion upon a
child's liberty,4 2 the majority believes that the common law limitations43
and remedies" are adequate safeguards for the public school student and
that the due process clause does not require notice and a hearing prior to
the imposition of corporal punishment. 45 Because the majority views the
risk of an unjustified paddling as "typically insignificant," the justices
comprising the majority believe that the imposition of even minimal due
process requirements outweighs the benefit of additional safeguards.
46
Additionally, the imposition of such requirements "would entail a signif-
icant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility," 47 an
area that has traditionally been left to the states.4
35. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
36. Should public opinion eventually condemn the use of corporal punishment or the
Court expand the concept of "punishment" into noncriminal fields, then, perhaps, the
Court would review its holding on the eighth amendment issue. The idea of corporal
punishment in the schools as punishment within the eighth amendment is too far removed
from current case law to permit the Court to declare it an eighth amendment violation.
37. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1412 (1977).
38. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
39. The fourteenth amendment provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977).
41. Id. at 1413.
42. The majority remarked that:
[i]n any deliberate infliction of corporal punishment on a child who is restrained
for that purpose, there is some risk that the intrusion of the child's liberty will be
unjustified and therefore unlawful. In these circumstances the child has a strong
interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment
and provide for the resolution of disputed questions of justification.
Id. at 1415.
43. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
44. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
45. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1418 (1977).
46. Id. at 1416-17.
47. Id. at 1418.
48. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 507 (1969). !
Common law remedies, however, are inadequate as safeguards,
since the remedy is imposed only after the infliction of excessive corporal
punishment, 49 which may have irreparably injured the child.5" While due
process procedures are no guarantee that excessive corporal punishment
will be eliminated, such procedures could reduce the risk of abuse.
51
The dissent in Ingraham envisions an informal give-and-take that
requires only the imposition of minimal due process procedures 52 whose
purpose would be "to protect the student's interest without undercutting
the disciplinary value of the punishment." 53 Although no guidelines were
specified, the safeguards articulated by the North Carolina District Court
in Baker v. Owen54 may serve as a model. The Baker court felt that, with
few exceptions, 55 students should be clearly informed that specific behav-
ior would result in the use of corporal punishment. Alternative means of
punishment must be attempted first. 56 During the administration of cor-
poral punishment a second school official must be present and informed
of the reason for the imposition of such punishment. As a final measure,
the administrator must give a full written explanation to any parent who
so requests.57 Such procedures would easily meet the standard contem-
plated by the dissent. "[T]he Constitution requires, 'if anything, less than
a fair-minded principal would impose upon himself' in order to avoid
injustice." 58 Similar standards are in effect in many jurisdictions, 59 but
such standards do not have the same force as a constitutional mandate. In
light of the growing concern about the rights of children in all types of
49. Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, discussed the rationale that "a postdepriva-
tion remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient." Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401,
1428 (1977). He points out the fact that this rationale is most persuasive when used in a case
in which a property interest has been invaded. Id. at 1428.
50. See id. at 1425. See generally 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 583 (1971).
51. If nothing else, the slight delay resulting from the use of due process procedures
will provide a "cooling off" period and thus reduce the risk of excessive punishment
imposed inadvertently through action taken too hastily. Proponents of the use of corporal
punishment often argue, however, that even this slight delay may lessen the effectiveness of
the punishment as a disciplinary tool. See contra, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 583, 593
(1971).
For further discussion concerning procedural safeguards see Note, Constitutional
Law-Procedural Due Process in the Administration of Corporal Punishment, I I WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 703 (1975).
52. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1425 (1977).
53. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 302 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
54. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
55. These exceptions were categorized as "acts of misconduct which are so anti-
social or disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience." Id. at 302.
56. Such measures would include detention, extra assignments, denial of a privilege,
or any other non-physical punishment.
57. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 302 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
58. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1427 (1977)(citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 583 (1975)).
59. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 10854, 10855 (Deering Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 232.27 (West 1977); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 75-6109 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. §
392.465 (1967). The Pennsylvania Education Code also contains similar provisions. See note
19 supra.
situations, 60 the opinion of the majority is a step backward.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Ingraham ensures the con-
tinuing use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, at least for the
foreseeable future. 6 1 Since the eighth amendment has been held inapplic-
able and no due process procedures are constitutionally mandated, the use
of corporal punishment is limited only by the common law requirement of
reasonableness and by the possibility of civil or criminal penalties. 62
Educators, psychologists, the public, and the courts have been arguing
the issue of corporal punishment in the public schools for over one
hundred years.63 There is little doubt that the controversy will continue to
rage despite the Ingraham decision.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-Broadcast Licensing-Divestiture Re-
quired in Cases of Local Cross-ownership of Newspapers and
Broadcast Media. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
At issue in National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting v. FCC'
were Federal Communications Commission regulations that prohibit the
creation of local newspaper-broadcast combinations,2 but require the
60. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)(procedural due process require-
ments must be met prior to the suspension of a student); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(schools may not deprive students of first and
fourteenth amendment rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)(due process requirements must
be met in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D.
Pa. 1975)(statute providing for commitment of minors to state mental health facilities
declared violative of due process).
61. Justice Powell notes that no trend toward the elimination of corporal punishment
in the public schools has been discerned. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407 (1977).
See note 36 supra.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1407. See notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text supra.
[Casenote by Barbara L. Hollenbach]
I. 555 F.2d 938 (1977).
2, No license for a television broadcast station shall be granted to any party
(including all parties under common control) if such party directly or indirectly
owns, operates or controls . . . a daily newspaper and the grant of such license
will result in the Grade A contour . . . encompassing the entire community in
which such newspaper is published.
47 C.F.R. § 636(a)(1) (1976). Similar provisions relating to AM and FM radio stations are
found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(a), 73.240(a)(1) (1976). In addition, the rules prohibit transfer of
both halves of a combination to a single party, except by inheritance or in purely pro forma
changes in ownership. Id. § 73.636 note 8. The word "control" is not limited to majority
stock ownership, but includes actual working control in whatever manner exercised. Id. §
73.636 note 1. Ownership, moreover, may consist of as little as a one percent stock interest.
Id. § 73.636 notes 2, 3, 4. A "daily newspaper" is an English language newspaper, other
disaffiliation of existing combinations only when they face no significant
local competition. 3 In a unanimous panel decision,4 the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
prospective ban, but vacated the rules treating existing cross-ownerships.
In ruling that divestiture is required in all cases except "when the
evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest,"
5
the court mandated far-reaching changes in the broadcast industry.6
Although the challenged regulations were the first to deal with
newspaper affiliation,7 concentration of media ownership had often been
a target of FCC rulemaking. In 1941 the Commission adopted its "chain
broadcasting" rules, designed to curtail the national networks' "unheal-
thy predominance" over the radio industry. 8 Banned as violating the
spirit of the antitrust laws, and thus the public interest in the "larger and
more effective use of radio,'' 9 were joint operation of more than one
network' 0 and ownership by a network organization of more than one
station in a single community." In 1943 the latter prohibition was
extended to all licensees, 12 so no individual could ownor control two
than a college paper, that is published four or more days a week and is circulated generally in
the community of publication. Id. § 73.636 note 10.
3. No renewal of license shall be granted for a a term extending beyond January
1, 1980, to any party that as of January 1, 1975, directly or indirectly owns,
operates or controls the only daily newspaper published in a community and also
as of January 1, 1975, directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls the only
commercial television station encompassing the entire community with a city-
grade signal.
Id. § 73.636(c). A "city-grade" signal is the most intense under the Commission's rules and
provides a clear signal to the entire community of licensure. The rules relating to AM and
FM radio parallel the quoted passage, except that divestiture is not required if there is a
separately owned, operated, and controlled television station licensed to serve the commu-
nity. Id. §§ 73.35(c), 73.240(c).
4. Chief Justice Bazelon wrote the opinion in which Justices Wright and Robinson
joined.
5. 555 F.2d at 966.
6. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text infra.
7. As an element contributing to concentration of media control, newspaper own-
ership had long been considered on an ad hoc basis in contested licensing proceedings. See
Heckman, Diversification of Control of the Media of Mass Communication-Policy or
Fallacy?, 42 GEO. L.J. 378 (1954); Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a
Structural Modelfor FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CIii. L.
REV. 573 (1976). On the history of FCC multiple ownership rules generally, see Howard,
Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. COMM. B.J. 1 (1975).
8. See Report on Chain Broadcasting, Docket 5060 (May 1941).
9. Section 303 of the Communications Act provides that the FCC "from time to time,
as the public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . .[s]tudy new uses for
radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest." 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 (1967). The chain
broadcasting rules were upheld, and the Commission's antitrust rationale approved, in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
10. Report on Chain Broadcasting, Docket 5060, at 92 (May 1941). While couched in
general terms, the prohibition in fact affected only the National Broadcasting Company,
which owned and operated two networks. The spun-off network became the American
Broadcasting Company. See generally E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING I THE
UNITED STATES (3 vols. 1967-70).
11. Report on Chain Broadcasting, Docket 5060, at 92 (May 1941). NBC, owning two
stations in each of four of the largest markets, was again the prime target, but CBS was also
forced to sell one of its eight stations. See Sherwood B. Brunton, I I F.C.C. 407,415 (1946).
12. 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943). In the following year, divestiture was required to
AM, two FM or two television stations in the same area.13 In 1953 the
Commission limited to seven the number of stations that one person could
own or control in any one of the three broadcast services. 14
In 1968 Docket 18110 was opened to receive comments on a propos-
al by the Commission that the rules be tightened to prohibit local own-
ership of more than one type of broadcast station.15 Despite vigorous
industry opposition, the proposal was adopted without substantial change
in 1970.16 At the same time, responding in part to suggestions by the
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting1 7 and the Justice Depart-
ment,' 8 the Commission proposed a ban on newspaper-broadcast combi-
nations with divestiture to achieve swift conformance. 19 Comments were
invited, especially as to the rules' potential economic impact.20 After five
years of controversy and delay,2' the Commission released its Second
Report and Order in Docket 1811022 and adopted the challenged regula-
achieve immediate compliance, affecting twenty-four cases of multiple ownership. FCC
Tenth Annual Report 11-12 (1944).
13. In fact, FM radio and television had already been subjected to so-called "duopo-
ly" restrictions in 1941. FCC Seventh Annual Report 30-34 (1941).
14. Report and Order in Docket 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). At first, only five
television stations were permitted, but the limit was very soon raised to seven, of which no
more than five might be VHF stations. Report and Order in Docket 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797
(1954). The Commission's authority to set numerical limits on station ownership was upheld
in Storer Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
15. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket 18110, FCC 68-33, 33 Fed. Reg. 5315
(1968). Only a prospective ban was contemplated, and daytime-only AM stations were not to
be affected at all.
16. First Report and Order in Docket 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970). The ban on AM-
FM combinations was later relaxed. Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket 18110, 28
F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
17. NCCB is a Washington-based non-profit organization whose stated purpose is to
represent the public interest before the FCC and the broadcast industry and to serve as a
spokesman for media reform at the national level. NCCB's chairperson is ex-FCC Commis-
sioner Nicholas Johnson.
18. The involvement of the Justice Department in FCC licensing policy began in 1968,
when the Antitrust Division initiated a practice of intervening in licensing proceedings that
raised concentration of ownership questions. See Beaumont Television Corp., 17 F.C.C.2d
577 (1969) (blocked sale of station to local newspaper interests); Shenandoah Life Stations,
Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 704 (1969) (transfer conditioned on transferee's divestiture of other media
holdings); Frontier Broadcasting Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 570 (1970), 35 F.C.C.2d 875 (1972)
(designation of concentration issue for hearing mooted by voluntary divestiture).
19. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970).
20. The Commission predicted that divesting licensees would suffer little economic
hardship, noting that divestiture would take place over a five year period, that losses could
be minimized through swapping stations, and that significant tax advantages would accrue
to sellers. Id. at 347-48.
21. Although comments and reply comments were filed by August of 1971, the
Commission took no action. In the fall of 1973, the Justice Department resumed its pre-1970
practice of challenging renewals of newspaper-affiliated stations, see The Washington Post,
January 20, 1974, at A-i, A-8, and the broadcasting industry lobbied for legislative relief.
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5546 et al., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Having
argued in Docket 18110 that a flexible case-by-case approach was preferable to the proposed
rules, the industry argued before the committee that case-by-case consideration in renewal
proceedings resulted in intolerable licensee insecurity and that industry "restructuring"
should be accomplished by rule. See Zuckman & Mason, The Great Cross-Media Ownership
Controversy, 60 A.B.A.J. 1570, 1572 (1974).
22. 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 40 Fed. Reg. 6449 (1975) (amending 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240,
tions. Petitions for judicial review were filed immediately. 23
Considering first the argument that the rules lack a rational basis,
24
the Court of Appeals noted that broadcast licensing is itself unprecedent-
ed and has been justified under the first amendment only on the ground
that the scarcity of usable frequencies made it a necessity if a chaos of
interference were to be avoided .25 "The hard choice was between forcing
free speech to bend or watching it break." 26 Since licensing necessarily
involves some restriction of free speech, the court reasoned, "it follows
that the Commission acts properly when it attempts to promote diversity
by allocating stations to those without control over an alternative major
media voice.' '27 By operating only indirectly to achieve diversity, the
cross-ownership rules also avoid the delicate constitutional questions
raised by a policy, such as the "fairness doctrine," that relies on govern-
ment control over broadcast content .28 Of course,
there is no guarantee that the prospective ban will increase
diversity in all cases, . . . [b]ut that does not make the attempt
irrational. It is not unreasonable for the Commission to assume
that the licensing of an independent, rather than an affiliated
73.636), reconsidered 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Order, 50 F.C.C.2d]. The
Order has been the subject of a spate of law review comments. See generally Comment,
Media Cross-Ownership-The FCC's Inadequate Response, 54 TEX. L. REV. 336 (1976);
Comment, A Primer on Docket Number 18110: The New FCC Cross-Ownership Rules, 59
MAR. L. REV. 584 (1976); Comment, Concentration of Ownership of the Media of Mass
Communication: An Examination of New FCC Rules on Cross Ownership of Co-located
Newspapers and Broadcast Stations, 24 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1975); Comment, Diversity
Ownership in Broadcasting: Affirmative Policy in Search of an Author, 27 U. FLA. L. REV.
502 (1975).
23. In addition to NCCB, numerous media industry representatives filed petitions for
review of the rules or intervened in actions brought by others or both. Among the more
prominent were the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the National Association
of Broadcasters, and the Washington Post Company. Although it took a position contrary to
that of the Commission, the Justice Department appeared as a respondent, conduct that
elicited heated protest from the industry. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, American
Newspaper Publishers Association v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (consolidated with
NCCB).
24. The task of the reviewing court is to determine whether agency action was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (1967). "This standard of review is a highly deferential one ... and
requires affirmance if a rational basis exists for the agency's decision." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
25. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Court
observed that prior to the establishment of the licensing system
new stations used any frequency they desired, regardless of the interference
thereby caused to others. Existing stations changed to other frequencies and
increased their power and hours of operation at will. The result was confusion and
chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.
Id. at 212.
26. 555 F.2d at 948.
27. Id. at 949.
28. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court
upheld FCC rules requiring licensees to provide the victim of a personal attack on the air a
reasonable opportunity to respond and, when a station endorses or opposes a political
candidate, to give the adversely affected candidate a chance to respond. 47 C.F.R. §§
73.123, 73.300, 73.679 (1976). The fairness doctrine, the Court of Appeals observed, "may
well mark the outer limits of a permissible diversification policy which relies on direct
government control over the content of broadcast programs." 555 F.2d at 950.
station, offers greater hope of providing the community a new
voice and to incorporate that assessment in its licensing policy.
The First Amendment seeks to further the 'search for truth.'
Surely that search will be facilitated by government policy that
encourages the maximum number of searchers.2 9
Industry intervenors also maintained that the prospective ban vio-
lated the FCC's statutory responsibility to consider each license applica-
tion on its public interest merits. 30 Relying on United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co. ,31 the court held that the ban was consistent with the
Commission's rule-making authority. In Storer the Supreme Court, af-
firming the Commission's power to make rules necessary for the orderly
conduct of its business,2 had upheld the 1953 multiple-ownership
rules.3 3 Storer, the Court of Appeals explained, "permits the Commis-
sion to codify in rule its understanding, if reasonable, of the public
interest licensing standard.'' 34 Since the court had already found the
diversification policy reasonable, it required no extension of Storer to
conclude that the Commission had authority to impose the prospective
ban.3
5
The industry also relied on Stahlman v. FCC,36 in which it had been
observed that the FCC's power "does not embrace and should not be
extended by implication to embrace a ban on newspapers as such ....
This, we think, would be in total contravention of that equality of right
and opportunity which Congress has meticulously written into the act
. .. .," While Stahlman thus "appears to resolve the question of
statutory authority, in fact it does not." 38 First, the quoted passage was
dictum.3 9 Second, the premise underlying the passage was that satisfac-
tion of the statutory qualifications of citizenship, character, and financial
and technical ability4° created in the applicant an "unchallengeable"
right to an available frequency. 4 This image of the FCC as a mere
"traffic cop" of the airwaves was specifically rejected in National
29. Id. at 950-51.
30. Section 309 of the Communications Act provides that "the Commission shall
determine, in the case of each application filed with it . . . , whether the public interest,
convenience and necessity will be served by the granting of such application," and if the
Commission's finding is affirmative, "it shall grant such application." 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)
(1970). If, on the other hand, "a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the
Commission for any reason is unable to make the finding specified .... it shall formally
designate the application for hearing . Id. § 309(e).
31. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
32. 351 U.S. at 202.
33. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
34. 555 F.2d at 951.
35. Id.
36. 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
37. Id. at 127.
38. 555 F.2d at952.
39. Called to testify at an FCC investigation into newspaper ownership of radio,
Stahlman disregarded the subpoena, which counsel had assured him was rendered void by
the illegal purpose of the hearings. The court upheld the subpoena.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1970).
41. 126 F.2d at 127.
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,42 which emphasized the agency's
"comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of
radio." 43 Industry reliance on Stahiman, therefore, was misplaced. 4
The court considered next the contention that the ban violates the
first amendment rights of broadcasters, noting at the outset that denial of
a broadcast license is not an abridgement of free speech.45 The licensing
process may not be used as a means of censorship, of course; but no claim
of censorship could be made in this case, for
[t]he ban neither mandates nor prohibits what may be publish-
ed. It only forbids the formation of co-located combinations the
Commission has determined do not serve the public interest. Of
course, in serving the public interest the ban may indirectly
affect the economics of publication, but the First Amendment
does not provide a shield against this.4
Having determined that the prospective ban is valid, the court
discussed the rules treating existing combinations.47 It noted that the
record developed in Docket 18110, although voluminous, 48 contained
"little reliable 'hard' information," 49 and agreed with the Commission's
apparent conclusion that no compelling factual case for broad-scale dives-
titure had been made nor was likely to be made. "Diversity and its
42. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). In NBC the Court upheld the FCC's "chain broadcasting"
rules. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
43. Id. at 217.
44. The American Newspaper Publishers Association also pointed to the opinion of
Hampson Gary, the FCC's first general counsel, that a newspaper's broadcast license
application could not be denied as against "public policy." Without reaching the question of
"what weight should be given to an agency's initial interpretation of its mandate," the court
noted that Gary had distinguished "public policy" from the statutory standard of "public
interest, convenience and necessity" and that his opinion pertained, in any event, to an
individual licensing rather than a rule-making proceeding. 555 F.2d at 951-52.
The ANPA also argued that Congress itself had declared that the FCC lacked authority
to ban newspaper ownership of broadcast stations. A proposed section of the Communica-
tions Act Amendments of 1952 would have precluded the Commission from promulgating
any rule or policy excluding newspapers as licensees. The section was deleted as unneces-
sary. See H.R. REP. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). In addition to finding the
argument generally unpersuasive, the court rejected it on the broader grounds that "the
history of subsequent legislative activity is not useful in determining the meaning of the
original legislation when enacted." 555 F.2d at 952 n.41.
45. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities
of radio without a license . . . . The standard [Congress] provided for the
licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience or necessity.' Denial of
a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free
speech.
Id. at 227.
46. 555 F.2d at 954.
47. Before considering the validity of the divestiture rule adopted by the Commission,
the court confronted the question of FCC authority to enact "retroactive" rules at all. This
issue, the court concluded, had been settled in American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1969), which rejected the argument "that the Storer doctrine
is restricted to regulations affecting future applications for new licenses or certificates
.I d. at 628.
48. Approximately 200 submissions were made in response to the original Further
Notice in 1970, including some twenty-five major studies. The Commission's later request
for still more information, 45 F.C.C.2d 768 (1974), produced forty-eight fresh filings.
49. 555 F.2d at 956.
effects," the court remarked, "are . . . elusive concepts, not easily
defined let alone measured without making qualitative judgments objec-
tionable on both policy and First Amendment grounds. "50 At the same
time, however, the record did not justify preserving existing combina-
tions either, for it contained almost no evidence that "divestiture would
produce the harmful effects feared, or how serious any such harm would
be. And the record no more establishes that cross-ownership serves the
public interest than injures it.' 51 Faced with an inconclusive record, the
Commission might properly have relied on policy considerations alone.
Had the Commission reasoned that because diversified own-
ership is prima facie in the public interest, local cross-own-
ership violates the public interest, it would have been rational
for it to conclude that divestiture was generally called for,
subject to any appropriate exceptions.
52
The Commission did not adopt this approach, however. Instead, it
characterized divestiture as a "harsh remedy" to be used "only where the
need is overwhelming and the evidence unambiguous." 53 In proposing
divestiture, the Commission explained, it had failed to give proper weight
to the following possible adverse consequences:
[1]. Requiring divestiture could reduce local ownership as
well as the involvement of owners in management as many
sales would have to be [to] outside interests.
[2]. The continuity of operation would be broken as the
new owner would lack the long knowledge of the community
and would have to begin raw.
[3]. Local economic dislocations are also possible as a
result of the vast demand for equity capital and wide-scale
divestiture could increase interest rates and affect selling price
too.5
4
In light of these considerations, overlooked when the rules were pro-
posed, the Commission concluded that to justify divestitures "a mere
hoped for gain in diversity is not enough. Unlike for [sic] prospective
rules, divestiture introduces the possibility of disruption for the industry
and hardship for individual owners."
55
The issue as the Commission saw it was what level of ownership
concentration was "egregious" enough to raise a presumption of harm to
the public interest justifying the "harsh remedy" of divestiture. It con-
cluded that such a level was reached when there was "an effective
monopoly in the marketplace of ideas as well as economically.' '56 The
crucial question, according to the Commission, was "whether a single
full-fledged choice was available," dealing with matters of local concern.
50. Id. at 961.
51. Id. at 962.
52. Id.
53. Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1083.
54. Id. at 1078.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1081.
When there was such a choice, "there would not be such an unacceptable
level of undue concentration." 57
Applying this conclusion to newspaper-broadcast affiliation, the
Commission declared that an unacceptable monopoly exists in any com-
munity whose only local newspaper is co-owned with the only television
station licensed to that community, unless it is also encompassed by a
city-grade television signal from an outside source.58 In a community
without any television station, cross-ownership of the only newspaper
and only radio station is tolerable only if the community is covered by a
high-grade radio signal from outside.59 Under these criteria, of the 153
newspaper-broadcast combinations,' twenty-five constitute unacceptable
ownership concentrations, including eight television and seventeen radio
stations.
61
The court prefaced its discussion of the divestiture rule by observing
that
[d]ivestiture, to begin with, is a misleading term in this context.
It implies that the broadcaster has that which the Communica-
tions Act specifically states he does not have-an interest in the
license beyond its expiration date-and that he is being forcibly
deprived of a right.
62
Renewals as well as new licenses must satisfy the statutory standard of
"public interest, convenience and necessity."
Diversification of the media, the court emphasized, had long been a
central policy of the FCC, grounded in both its statutory mandate and in
first amendment principles. By enhancing diversity of viewpoint, divesti-
ture would promote "the larger and more effective use" of broadcasting,
in accordance with the Communications Act. 63 That legislation reflects
the still more fundamental assumption of the first amendment "that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagon-
istic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . ... 64 In the
57. Id.
58. "City-grade" is the highest classification of signal and assures a consistently good
picture to all receivers within the signal's contour. Within their city grade signal, the
Commission reasoned, broadcasters might reasonably be expected to provide adequate
attention to local needs and concerns. Id.
59. Absence of a strong outside radio signal, in light of the great number of radio
stations, suggests that the monopoly community is so remote and rural that no television
station not actually licensed to it could be expected to provide adequate coverage of local
affairs. Id. at 1084.
60. Broadcasting, March 7, 1977, at 21.
61. It was not the Commission's "intention that the rules should work a forfeiture."
Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1085. Inability to sell, therefore, or ability to sell only at a depressed
price, would be grounds for a waiver. "Likewise, if it could be shown that separate
ownership and operation of the newspaper and station cannot be supported in the locality,
waiver might well be appropriate." Id. In two cases the Commission sua sponte granted
waivers of the rules.
62. 555 F.2d at 962. Section 301 of the Act provides that "no [broadcast] license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license."
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
63. See note 9 supra.
64. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. i, 20 (1945).
words of the Commission, "[i]f our democratic society is to function,
nothing can be more important than insuring that there is a free flow of
information from as many divergent sources as possible."65 The Com-
mission may not have intended its statement to be taken literally, "[b]ut
at the least, consistency would call for ordering divestiture absent a
showing of greater public interest harm."66
Far from finding the countervailing factors adduced by the Commis-
sion sufficient to rebut the powerful presumption raised in favor of
divestiture, 67 the court determined them to be woefully lacking in eviden-
tiary support. The Commission had expressed a fear that divestiture
would decrease local ownership and owner-management integration. The
former, however, is significant only when combined with the latter, 68 and
"even when both are present, they are not of primary importance to the
Commission. A licensee may sell its license without regard to whether the
new owner intends to participate actively in management." 69 The Com-
mission also failed to consider those combinations that are currently
under absentee ownership and that may through divestiture become lo-
cally owned.
According to the Commission, "[d]ivestiture introduced the danger
of disruption in programming continuity with the result that there would
either be programming deterioration or a vacuum in planned pro-
gramming caused by the departure of experienced management and
personnel."70 The court dismissed this contention as at odds with the
FCC practice of routinely approving license assignments. 7' New own-
ership, moreover, commonly retains management and operating person-
nel to assure a smooth transition. "Indeed, any other action by the new
licensee would only reduce the value of his franchise."72
Finally, the Commission had warned that "[l]ocal economic disloca-
tions are also possible as a result of the vast demand for equity capital and
wide-scale divestiture could increase interest rates and affect selling price
65. Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1079 (emphasis in original),
66. 555 F.2d at 963.
67. The court observed that "[tihe most natural reading of the Commission's Order is
that the burden of persuasion was placed on the proponents of divestiture. A strained,
though possible, reading is that the burden placed on the opponents was met by the mere
existence of competing policies." Id. at 962 n.90. Since the court found that the original
presumption was not effectively rebutted, its ultimate holding is unaffected by the choice of
reading.
68. "Owner management is significant because it increases the likelihood that station
policy will be attuned to local needs; local ownership by itself offers no such promise." Id.
at 963.
69. Id.
70. Reply Brief for Respondent (FCC) at 17, National Citizens Committee for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir 1977) [hereinafter cited as FCC Reply Brief].
71. 555 F.2d at 964. The Justice Department noted that 678 transfers had been
approved without hearing between 1968 and 1974. Brief for Respondent (United States) at
42, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Of
these approximately 60% were pro forma assignments or transfers by inheritance. FCC
Reply Brief, supra note 70, at 18.
72. Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1128 (Commissioner Robinson, dissenting).
too." ,73 Certain passages in the Second Report and Order suggest that the
Commission was concerned with financial hardship to licensees.7 4 As the
court points out, however, the Communications Act takes cognizance of
private losses only when they are shown to injure broadcasting service to
the public,75 and nowhere did the Commission present any factual basis
for its fears or explain how they bear on the public interest.
76
The court concluded, therefore, that the Commission could not
rationally have relied on these competing policies to rebut the presump-
tion in favor of divestiture.
The gains in diversity from divestiture may be speculative, but
since divestiture is the most promising method for increasing
diversity that does not entail governmental supervision of
speech, the Commission could not rationally conclude that les-
ser policies, lackin support in the record, require maintenance
of the status quo."
Furthermore, even if the Commission's general approach were not thus
fatally defective, the particular divestiture rule adopted still could not
stand. As noted by the court, there is nothing in the record to show that
the need for divestiture in the sixteen cases in which it was ordered was
"overwhelming" or that the evidence was "unambiguous." "Although
the affected markets contain fewer voices, the amount of diversity in
communities with additional independent voices may in fact be no great-
er.''
78
In remanding to the Commission for adoption of a rule not inconsis-
tent with its opinion, the court did not suggest what the nature of that rule
should be, but there are two basic approaches that presumably would
meet with the court's approval. Across-the-board divestiture in all cases
of cross-ownership, subject only to a narrow waiver provision,79 clearly
would be acceptable. A somewhat less drastic rule might also pass
muster. In its discussion of the necessity for individualized hearings
before divestiture may be ordered, the court observed,
73. Id. at 1078.
74. Divestiture was described as introducing the possibility of "hardship for individu-
al owners." Id. The Commission referred also to "[t]raditions of service" established by
those who entered broadcasting "long before there was hope of profit ....... Id. Such
meritorious service, the Commission argued, is reflected in "legitimate renewal expectan-
cies . . .implied in the structure of the Communications Act." FCC Reply Brief, supra
note 70, at 15. The existence of such expectancies, however, is a matter of dispute. See
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Com-
ment, Media Reform Through Comparative Licensing-The Citizens Case, 57 IOWA L. REV.
912 (1972).
75. 555 F.2d at 964.
76. In its reply brief, the FCC explained that the shortage of capital would impair the
new owner's ability to finance public affairs programming. FCC Reply Brief, supra note 70,
at 20. This problem is present to some degree in any transfer, however, and the Commission
advanced no reason to believe it would be significantly aggravated in the context of
divestiture.
77. 555 F.2d at 965.
78. Id. at 966.
79. The court characterized as "excellent" the Commission's discussion of circum-
stances in which a waiver might be appropriate. Id. n. 112.
If, for example, the Commission were to adopt on remand a
policy of requiring divestiture where combinations have over
30% of the market in the community of operation, it would
presumably be necessary to determine the market shares of giv-
en combinations by hearing.
80
Thus the court appears to approve of a market share approach similar to
that used by the Justice Department in Clayton Act litigation.8' What
effect the adoption of this approach might have on the Commission's
prospective ban is unclear, however. The industry could argue with
considerable logic that any market share acceptable when controlled by
an existing cross-ownership must be acceptable prospectively as well.
Indeed, the court's own opinion strongly suggests that no distinctions
may be made between existing and prospective combinations, at least not
without stronger evidentiary support for considerations militating against
divestiture.
The court's holding has profound implications for the broadcasting
industry. A rule requiring divestiture in all cases of cross-ownership
could result in ownership realignment of approximately two billion dol-
lars worth of media properties,82 and the figure could rise considerably if
the court's reasoning were also applied to radio-television combina-
tions.83 Adoption of such regulations is not imminent, however, as the
matter is virtually certain to go before the Supreme Court. 8 Nevertheless,
the decision has already had an impact in that it has enhanced substantial-
ly the bargaining position of parties contesting renewal of cross-owned
licenses. 85 By agreeing to divest within a certain time, cross-owners
80. Id. at 956 n.53.
81. Both the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Justice Depart-
ment had urged in their submissions to Docket 18110 that the Commission adopt a market
share approach. See Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1056-59. As the means of determing audience
share, NCCB suggested use of a statistical model developed by Terrall M. de Jonckheere
that assigned a certain numerical weight to each of the mass media, indicating its relative
importance. See T. M. DE JONCKHEERE, MONOPOLY IN THE MEDIA (1968). In keeping with its
antitrust perspective, the Justice Department advocated an economic analysis based on
advertising revenues, an approach well explicated in Bennet, Media Concentration and the
FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 159 (1971). In his thorough
and well reasoned dissent to the Order, Commissioner Robinson dealt at length with the
market share alternative. See Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1122-26.
82. The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1977, at 4.
83. Radio-television combinations were banned prospectively in the First Report and
Order in Docket 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970). Divestiture was proposed at the same time,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970), but was not adopted.
Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1054.
84. In reliance on the Commission's expressed intent to file as quickly as possible for
review in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate insofar as it applied
to existing cross-ownerships. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555
F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
85. "Any party in interest" may file with the Commission a "petition to deny,"
challenging the grant or renewal of a broadcast license as inconsistent with "the public
interest, convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970). Once limited to those who
might be injured by interference or economic competition, the class of parties in interest has
been expanded to include consumer spokesmen. Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). One of the grounds for denial is
"undue concentration of control" of the local or regional media. See Clarksburg Pub. Co. v.
FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Frontier Broadcasting Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 570 (1970).
avoid the extraordinary expense and other burdens of an administrative
battle that, even if renewal is granted, may now only postpone the day of
reckoning.86 Implementation of the Commission's rules, on the other
hand, would have solidified the position of existing combinations by
making renewal challenges more difficult.87
86. The prospect of costly hearings, and their possible futility in light of the court's
decision, probably played a role in the settlement between the owners of WGAL-TV in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and a local citizens group petitioning for denial of their license.
See WGAL-Television, Inc., FCC 76-1195 (Dec. 21, 1976). The owners of both Lancaster
daily newspapers, the Sunday newspaper, and a controlling interest in the city's only CATV
system agreed to sell their VHF station by 1981. See Harrisburg Patriot, April 21, 1977, at 4.
87. 555 F.2d at 966 n.108. The Order declares that henceforth, to raise the issue of
undue concentration of media control, petitioners to deny must allege "ecomonic monopoli-
zation that might warrant actions under the Sherman Act .... ." Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at
1088. The Commission does not explain why in this context it abandoned the first amend-
ment considerations that it had otherwise given primary importance and substituted a
strictly economic approach. As the Commission itself later conceded, it
has neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to enforce the antitrust laws
in its regulation of the broadcast industry. In our view, enforcement of the
Sherman Act and similar statutes rests properly with other federal agencies. ...
We believe it inappropriate for the Commission to duplicate the function of the
courts or other agencies having antitrust jurisdiction and expertise.
WGAL-Television, Inc., FCC 76-1195, at 5-6 (Dec. 21, 1976).
[Casenote by Mark W. Budwig]
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